School of Management, Chongqing Institute of Engineering, Chongqing, China.
School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China.
PLoS One. 2024 Mar 15;19(3):e0299915. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0299915. eCollection 2024.
The development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is one of the effective ways to alleviate carbon emissions, environmental pollution, and energy scarcity in the transportation sector. The Chinese government has innovatively proposed the "dual credit policy," but it is still a hot topic whether it can promote the NEVs' technological innovation. In this study, we construct game models and obtain the technological innovation strategies for NEVs under the dual credit policy, considering that the NEV supply chain contains one manufacturer and N suppliers. Further, we construct bargaining game models and study how to encourage manufacturers and suppliers to enhance technological innovation, realize supply chain coordination, and give the alliance strategy to maximize suppliers' profit. We found that the dual credit policy can effectively stimulate technological innovation, and the higher the credit price or technological innovation credit factor, the higher the technical level of NEVs. The findings could guide the government to adjust and revise the policy. Second, we found that the bargaining games could coordinate the NEV supply chain so that decentralized enterprises can achieve optimal technological innovation under centralized decision-making. Third, we found that suppliers can improve their profits by choosing a suitable alliance strategy under the manufacturer's different negotiating power.
新能源汽车（NEV）的发展是缓解交通运输领域碳排放、环境污染和能源短缺的有效途径之一。中国政府创新性地提出了“双积分政策”，但它是否能促进新能源汽车的技术创新仍是一个热点话题。在本研究中，我们构建了博弈模型，考虑到新能源汽车供应链包含一个制造商和 N 个供应商，获得了双积分政策下新能源汽车的技术创新策略。进一步，我们构建了讨价还价博弈模型，并研究了如何激励制造商和供应商提高技术创新，实现供应链协调，并给出了最大化供应商利润的联盟策略。我们发现，双积分政策可以有效地刺激技术创新，信用价格或技术创新信用因子越高，新能源汽车的技术水平越高。研究结果可以指导政府调整和修改政策。其次，我们发现讨价还价博弈可以协调新能源汽车供应链，使分散的企业在集中决策下能够实现最优的技术创新。第三，我们发现供应商可以通过选择制造商不同谈判能力下的合适联盟策略来提高利润。
