Fitzpatrick Simon, Goodrich Grant
Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, 1 John Carroll Boulevard, University Heights, OH, 44118, USA.
The Krause Center for Leadership and Ethics, The Citadel, 171 Moultrie Street, Charleston, SC, 29409, USA.
J Hist Biol. 2017 Aug;50(3):525-569. doi: 10.1007/s10739-016-9451-x.
Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936) is widely regarded as the father of modern comparative psychology. Yet, Morgan initially had significant doubts about whether a genuine science of comparative psychology was even possible, only later becoming more optimistic about our ability to make reliable inferences about the mental capacities of non-human animals. There has been a fair amount of disagreement amongst scholars of Morgan's work about the nature, timing, and causes of this shift in Morgan's thinking. We argue that Morgan underwent two quite different shifts of attitude towards the proper practice of comparative psychology. The first was a qualified acceptance of the Romanesian approach to comparative psychology that he had initially criticized. The second was a shift away from Romanes' reliance on systematizing anecdotal evidence of animal intelligence towards an experimental approach, focused on studying the development of behaviour. We emphasize the role of Morgan's evolving epistemological views in bringing about the first shift - in particular, his philosophy of science. We emphasize the role of an intriguing but overlooked figure in the history of comparative psychology in explaining the second shift, T. Mann Jones, whose correspondence with Morgan provided an important catalyst for Morgan's experimental turn, particularly the special focus on development. We also shed light on the intended function of Morgan's Canon, the methodological principle for which Morgan is now mostly known. The Canon can only be properly understood by seeing it in the context of Morgan's own unique experimental vision for comparative psychology.
康威·劳埃德·摩根（1852 - 1936）被广泛视为现代比较心理学之父。然而，摩根最初对比较心理学能否成为一门真正的科学抱有重大疑虑，只是后来才对我们推断非人类动物心理能力的可靠程度变得更加乐观。摩根著作的学者们对于摩根思想转变的性质、时间和原因存在不少分歧。我们认为摩根对比较心理学的正确实践经历了两种截然不同的态度转变。第一种是对他最初批评的罗曼尼斯式比较心理学方法的有限接受。第二种是从罗曼尼斯依赖整理动物智力的轶事证据转向一种专注于研究行为发展的实验方法。我们强调摩根不断演变的认识论观点在促成第一次转变中的作用——特别是他的科学哲学。我们强调在比较心理学史上一个有趣但被忽视的人物T. 曼·琼斯在解释第二次转变中的作用，他与摩根的通信为摩根的实验转向提供了重要催化剂，尤其是对发展的特别关注。我们还阐明了摩根法则的预期功能，摩根现在主要因这一方法论原则而闻名。只有将其置于摩根自己独特的比较心理学实验愿景的背景下，才能正确理解该法则。
