Scher S J, Cooper J
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, New Jersey 08544.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 1989 Jun;56(6):899-906. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.56.6.899.
This article provides the first empirical test of the idea that discrepancy is not needed in order to arouse cognitive dissonance. Dissonance was aroused when Ss felt responsible for some aversive consequence, regardless of whether their behavior was consistent (writing a proattitudinal essay) or inconsistent (a counterattitudinal essay) with beliefs. The data demonstrate that in both situations, dissonance is aroused. This result, based on the dissonance motivation model of Cooper and Fazio (1984), strongly suggests that the motivational basis for dissonance is the felt responsibility for aversive consequences. The theoretical implications of this outlook are explored, including a discussion of the many ways that it expands the applicability of dissonance theory.
本文首次对“为引发认知失调并不需要存在差异”这一观点进行了实证检验。当被试者感到要为某种厌恶性后果负责时，就会引发失调，无论他们的行为与信念是一致的（撰写支持性文章）还是不一致的（反对性文章）。数据表明，在这两种情况下都会引发失调。基于库珀和法齐奥（1984年）的失调动机模型，这一结果有力地表明，失调的动机基础是对厌恶性后果的责任感。本文探讨了这一观点所具有理论意义，包括讨论它在诸多方面如何扩展了失调理论的适用性。
