Stuart Michael T
Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Cathedral of Learning, Room 817Q, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, USA.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2016 Aug;58:24-33. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.04.002. Epub 2016 May 6.
I claim that one way thought experiments contribute to scientific progress is by increasing scientific understanding. Understanding does not have a currently accepted characterization in the philosophical literature, but I argue that we already have ways to test for it. For instance, current pedagogical practice often requires that students demonstrate being in either or both of the following two states: 1) Having grasped the meaning of some relevant theory, concept, law or model, 2) Being able to apply that theory, concept, law or model fruitfully to new instances. Three thought experiments are presented which have been important historically in helping us pass these tests, and two others that cause us to fail. Then I use this operationalization of understanding to clarify the relationships between scientific thought experiments, the understanding they produce, and the progress they enable. I conclude that while no specific instance of understanding (thus conceived) is necessary for scientific progress, understanding in general is.
我认为思想实验推动科学进步的一种方式是增进科学理解。在哲学文献中，理解目前尚无被广泛接受的定义，但我认为我们已有检验它的方法。例如，当前的教学实践常常要求学生展现出处于以下两种状态之一或两者兼具：1）理解某些相关理论、概念、定律或模型的含义，2）能够有效地将该理论、概念、定律或模型应用于新的实例。本文展示了三个在历史上对帮助我们通过这些检验具有重要意义的思想实验，以及另外两个使我们未能通过检验的思想实验。然后，我运用这种对理解的操作性定义来阐明科学思想实验、它们所产生的理解以及它们所促成的进步之间的关系。我的结论是，虽然科学进步并非需要（如此定义的）理解的特定实例，但总体而言理解是必要的。
