Mieth Laura, Bell Raoul, Buchner Axel
1 Institute of Experimental Psychology, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany.
Exp Psychol. 2016 Sep;63(5):263-277. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000338.
The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners' facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.
本研究旨在测试基于外貌的积极和消极期望如何影响合作与惩罚。参与者与合作或背叛的伙伴进行囚徒困境游戏。然后他们有一个代价高昂的惩罚选项：他们可以花钱减少伙伴的收益。汇总多次试验结果，与惩罚外貌不可亲和不微笑的伙伴的背叛相比，参与者会花费更多金钱来惩罚外貌可亲且微笑的伙伴的背叛，但这只是因为参与者更有可能与外貌可亲且微笑的伙伴合作，这为参与者提供了更多进行道德惩罚的机会。当表示为条件概率时，道德惩罚并不因伙伴的面部亲和力而有所不同。微笑对道德惩罚的概率没有影响，但与不微笑的伙伴相比，对微笑伙伴的惩罚更轻。
