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表达情绪但不私下表达,会减少囚徒困境游戏中的道德惩罚。

Communicating emotions, but not expressing them privately, reduces moral punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma game.

机构信息

Department of Experimental Psychology, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Universitätsstrasse 1, 40225, Düsseldorf, Germany.

出版信息

Sci Rep. 2023 Sep 6;13(1):14693. doi: 10.1038/s41598-023-41886-9.

DOI:10.1038/s41598-023-41886-9
PMID:37673945
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10482980/
Abstract

The existence of moral punishment, that is, the fact that cooperative people sacrifice resources to punish defecting partners requires an explanation. Potential explanations are that people punish defecting partners to privately express or to communicate their negative emotions in response to the experienced unfairness. If so, then providing participants with alternative ways to privately express or to communicate their emotions should reduce moral punishment. In two experiments, participants interacted with cooperating and defecting partners in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. After each round, participants communicated their emotions to their partners (Experiments 1 and 2) or only expressed them privately (Experiment 2). Each trial concluded with a costly punishment option. Compared to a no-expression control group, moral punishment was reduced when emotions were communicated to the defecting partner but not when emotions were privately expressed. Moral punishment may thus serve to communicate emotions to defecting partners. However, moral punishment was only reduced but far from being eliminated, suggesting that the communication of emotions does not come close to replacing moral punishment. Furthermore, prompting participants to focus on their emotions had undesirable side-effects: Privately expressing emotions diminished cooperation, enhanced hypocritical punishment (i.e., punishment of defecting partners by defecting participants), and induced an unspecific bias to punish the partners irrespective of their actions.

摘要

道德惩罚的存在,即合作的人牺牲资源来惩罚背叛的伙伴,这需要一个解释。潜在的解释是,人们惩罚背叛的伙伴是为了私下表达或传达他们对所经历的不公平的负面情绪。如果是这样,那么为参与者提供私下表达或传达情绪的替代方式应该会减少道德惩罚。在两个实验中,参与者在囚徒困境游戏中与合作和背叛的伙伴互动。在每一轮之后,参与者向他们的伙伴表达他们的情绪(实验 1 和 2)或仅私下表达(实验 2)。每个试验都以一个代价高昂的惩罚选择结束。与无表达对照组相比,当情绪传达给背叛伙伴时,道德惩罚会减少,但当情绪私下表达时,道德惩罚不会减少。因此,道德惩罚可能是为了向背叛的伙伴传达情绪。然而,道德惩罚只是减少了,但远未消除,这表明情绪的传达并不能接近取代道德惩罚。此外,提示参与者关注自己的情绪会产生不良的副作用:私下表达情绪会削弱合作,增强虚伪的惩罚(即,背叛的参与者对背叛的伙伴进行惩罚),并引起一种不具体的偏见,即不管伙伴的行为如何,都要惩罚他们。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/30ba500c1c35/41598_2023_41886_Fig8_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/db2d7fda388e/41598_2023_41886_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/16482e079322/41598_2023_41886_Fig2_HTML.jpg
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https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/d8f559bc72f0/41598_2023_41886_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/3f94c2994e34/41598_2023_41886_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/86953f91b7a2/41598_2023_41886_Fig6_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/8280fa7eb2f8/41598_2023_41886_Fig7_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/30ba500c1c35/41598_2023_41886_Fig8_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/db2d7fda388e/41598_2023_41886_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/16482e079322/41598_2023_41886_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/ed8d1c70d784/41598_2023_41886_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/d8f559bc72f0/41598_2023_41886_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/3f94c2994e34/41598_2023_41886_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/86953f91b7a2/41598_2023_41886_Fig6_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/8280fa7eb2f8/41598_2023_41886_Fig7_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/00e0/10482980/30ba500c1c35/41598_2023_41886_Fig8_HTML.jpg

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