Heiphetz Larisa, Gelman Susan A, Young Liane L
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA.
Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA.
J Exp Child Psychol. 2017 Apr;156:82-98. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.11.015. Epub 2017 Jan 2.
Previous work shows that children view group membership and psychological traits in essentialist terms, perceiving them to be both biologically determined and stable across time. To what extent might individuals view mental states such as beliefs similarly? Given that beliefs are often based on experience and can change across time, one hypothesis is that beliefs on the whole do not elicit essentialism. An alternative hypothesis, however, is that some beliefs may be perceived as inherited and stable over time-characteristics associated with essentialism. In three studies, we examined two aspects of psychological essentialism regarding three different types of beliefs (religious beliefs, factual beliefs, and opinions) in 8- to 10-year-old children and adults, asking whether beliefs are seen as (a) biologically based and/or (b) stable across time. Both children and adults distinguished among belief types when considering biology; opinions were perceived to be more rooted in biology than were other beliefs. By contrast, fewer consistent differences emerged when children and adults considered stability. For example, both children and adults perceived opinions and factual beliefs to be equally changeable. Finally, although children typically perceived beliefs to be more rooted in biology than adults, more specific patterns across belief types (e.g., perceiving opinions to be more rooted in biology than religious beliefs) remained relatively stable across age groups. Thus, development and social learning may play a larger role in perceptions of the biological component of essentialism than in judgments of particular beliefs. We discuss implications for literatures on essentialism, religious cognition, and social cognitive development.
先前的研究表明，儿童以本质主义的方式看待群体成员身份和心理特征，认为它们是由生物学决定的，并且随时间推移保持稳定。个体在多大程度上可能会以类似的方式看待信念等心理状态呢？鉴于信念通常基于经验且会随时间变化，一种假设是，总体而言信念不会引发本质主义。然而，另一种假设是，某些信念可能被视为是遗传的，并且随时间推移保持稳定——这些特征与本质主义相关。在三项研究中，我们考察了8至10岁儿童和成年人对于三种不同类型信念（宗教信仰、事实性信念和观点）的心理本质主义的两个方面，询问信念是否被视为（a）基于生物学的和/或（b）随时间推移保持稳定的。在考虑生物学因素时，儿童和成年人都对信念类型进行了区分；相较于其他信念，观点被认为在生物学上的根基更深厚。相比之下，当儿童和成年人考虑稳定性时，出现的一致性差异较少。例如，儿童和成年人都认为观点和事实性信念同样容易改变。最后，尽管儿童通常比成年人更认为信念在生物学上有更深的根基，但不同信念类型的更具体模式（例如，认为观点在生物学上比宗教信仰有更深的根基）在不同年龄组中保持相对稳定。因此，发展和社会学习在对本质主义生物学成分的认知中可能比在对特定信念的判断中发挥更大的作用。我们讨论了对本质主义、宗教认知和社会认知发展相关文献的启示。
