O'Brien Ed, Klein Nadav
Booth School of Business, University of Chicago.
Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2017 Feb;112(2):161-185. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000070.
Change often emerges from a series of small doses. For example, a person may conclude that a happy relationship has eroded not from 1 obvious fight but from smaller unhappy signs that at some point "add up." Everyday fluctuations therefore create ambiguity about when they reflect substantive shifts versus mere noise. Ten studies reveal an asymmetry in this first point when people conclude "official" change: people demand less evidence to diagnose lasting decline than lasting improvement, despite similar evidential quality. This effect was pervasive and replicated across many domains and parameters. For example, a handful of poor grades, bad games, and gained pounds led participants to diagnose intellect, athleticism, and health as "officially" changed; yet corresponding positive signs were dismissed as fickle flukes (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c). This further manifested in real-time reactions: participants interpreted the same graphs of change in the economy and public health as more meaningful if framed as depicting decline versus improvement (Study 2), and were more likely to gamble actual money on continued bad versus good luck (Study 3). Why? Effects held across self/other change, added/subtracted change, and intended/unintended change (Studies 4a, 4b, and 4c), suggesting a generalized negativity bias. Teasing this apart, we highlight a novel "entropy" component beyond standard accounts like risk aversion: good things seem more truly capable of losing their positive qualities than bad things seem capable of gaining them, rendering signs of decline to appear more immediately diagnostic (Studies 5 and 6). An asymmetric tipping point raises theoretical and practical implications for how people might inequitably react to smaller signs of change. (PsycINFO Database Record
变化往往源于一系列小的影响因素。例如,一个人可能会得出结论,一段美满的关系并非毁于一场明显的争吵,而是源于一些在某个时候“累积起来”的较小的不愉快迹象。因此,日常波动会让人对这些波动何时反映实质性变化,何时只是随机干扰产生困惑。十项研究揭示了人们在判断“正式”变化时在这一点上的不对称性:尽管证据质量相似,但人们在诊断持续下降时所需的证据比诊断持续改善时少。这种效应普遍存在,并在许多领域和参数中得到了重复验证。例如,少数几个糟糕的成绩、表现不佳的比赛和体重增加,就让参与者判定智力、运动能力和健康状况“正式”发生了变化;而相应的积极迹象却被视为不可靠的侥幸(研究1a、1b和1c)。这一点在实时反应中也进一步体现出来:如果将经济和公共卫生的变化图表描述为下降而不是改善,参与者会认为这些图表更有意义(研究2),而且他们更有可能把真钱押在持续的坏运气而不是好运气上(研究3)。为什么会这样呢?这种效应在自我/他人变化、增减变化以及有意/无意变化中都存在(研究4a、4b和4c),这表明存在一种普遍的消极偏见。在梳理这一现象时,我们发现了一个超出风险规避等标准解释的新的“熵”因素:好事似乎比坏事更有可能失去其积极品质,这使得下降的迹象看起来更能直接说明问题(研究5和6)。这种不对称的临界点对人们如何不公平地应对较小的变化迹象具有理论和实际意义。(《心理学文摘数据库记录》 )