Department of Psychology, Harvard University.
Law School, Yale University.
J Exp Psychol Gen. 2017 Feb;146(2):165-181. doi: 10.1037/xge0000252.
Recent scientific research has settled on a purely descriptive definition of happiness that is focused solely on agents' psychological states (high positive affect, low negative affect, high life satisfaction). In contrast to this understanding, recent research has suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness is also sensitive to the moral value of agents' lives. Five studies systematically investigate and explain the impact of morality on ordinary assessments of happiness. Study 1 demonstrates that moral judgments influence assessments of happiness not only for untrained participants, but also for academic researchers and even in those who study happiness specifically. Studies 2 and 3 then respectively ask whether this effect may be explained by general motivational biases or beliefs in a just world. In both cases, we find evidence against these explanations. Study 4 shows that the impact of moral judgments cannot be explained by changes in the perception of descriptive psychological states. Finally, Study 5 compares the impact of moral and nonmoral value, and provides evidence that unlike nonmoral value, moral value is part of the criteria that govern the ordinary concept of happiness. Taken together, these studies provide a specific explanation of how and why the ordinary concept of happiness deviates from the definition used by researchers studying happiness. (PsycINFO Database Record
最近的科学研究提出了一种纯粹描述性的幸福定义,该定义仅关注于主体的心理状态(高积极情绪、低消极情绪、高生活满意度)。与这种理解相反,最近的研究表明,普通的幸福概念也对主体生活的道德价值敏感。五项研究系统地调查和解释了道德对普通幸福感评估的影响。研究 1 表明,道德判断不仅会影响未经训练的参与者的幸福感评估,也会影响学术研究人员,甚至是专门研究幸福感的人员的幸福感评估。研究 2 和研究 3 分别探讨了这种影响是否可以用一般的动机偏差或公正世界信念来解释。在这两种情况下,我们都发现这些解释的证据不足。研究 4 表明,道德判断的影响不能用描述性心理状态感知的变化来解释。最后,研究 5 比较了道德价值和非道德价值的影响,并提供了证据表明,与非道德价值不同,道德价值是支配普通幸福概念的标准之一。综上所述,这些研究提供了一种具体的解释,说明普通幸福概念是如何以及为何偏离了研究幸福的研究人员所使用的定义。