de Campos Thana C
a University of Ottawa , Canada.
b Law Casas Institute , UK.
New Bioeth. 2016 Apr;22(1):71-81. doi: 10.1080/20502877.2016.1155265.
Human rights advocates often use inflated and thus underspecified terminologies when addressing the content of their claims. One example of such loose terminology is the term 'well-being', as currently employed in connection with a definition for the right to health. What I call the 'well-being conception of health' conflates the distinct ideas of basic and non-basic health needs, as well as those of individual autonomy and freedom. I call this the conflation problem. This paper argues for the need of an understanding of the right to health, nuanced enough to capture not only these distinct ideas, but also their moral relevance for the common good.
人权倡导者在阐述其主张的内容时，常常使用夸张因而不够明确的术语。这种表述松散的术语的一个例子就是“福祉”一词，目前它与健康权的定义相关联。我所称的“健康的福祉概念”将基本和非基本健康需求的不同理念，以及个人自主和自由的理念混为一谈。我将此称为混淆问题。本文主张需要对健康权有一个细致入微的理解，这种理解不仅要能把握这些不同的理念，还要能把握它们对于共同利益的道德相关性。
