Shah Esha
Water Resources Management Group, Department of Environmental Sciences, Wageningen University, Drovendaalsesteeg 3a, 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands.
Minerva. 2017;55(1):117-138. doi: 10.1007/s11024-017-9313-5. Epub 2017 Jan 30.
The main focus of this essay is to closely engage with the role of scientist-subjectivity in the making of objectivity in Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison's book and Daston's later and earlier works and I have posited four challenges to the neo-Kantian and Foucauldian constructions of the co-implication of psychology and epistemology presented in these texts. Firstly, following Jacques Lacan's work, I have argued that the subject of science constituted by the mode of modern science suffers from paranoia. It is not the fear of subjectivity interfering with objectivity but the impossibility of knowing the truth of the that causes paranoia. Here, I have argued that it is not the ethos of objectivity that drives epistemology as Daston and Galison suggest, but the pathos of paranoia. The second challenge builds upon Kant's own denial that the perfect correspondence between the human will and the moral law is possible. Kant himself thought that an ethical human act is impossible without the component of "pathology." This questions Daston and Galison's argument that there is always ethical imperative at the core of epistemic virtue. The third challenge contests the way Daston and Galison take in their application of the Foucauldian concept of in modeling the master scientist-self. The fourth challenge questions the notion of the psychological and unconscious in the making of epistemology in Daston's later and earlier work. Against this background, I aim to make a claim that understanding and disclosing "entities" in the scientific domain presupposes an understanding of "being" in general. My goal is to open up the discussion for an alternative conception of the scientist-subject and thereby an affective and existential formulation of science.
本文的主要焦点是深入探讨科学家主观性在洛林·达斯顿（Lorraine Daston）和彼得·加利森（Peter Galison）的著作以及达斯顿早期和后期作品中客观性形成过程中的作用。我对这些文本中呈现的新康德主义和福柯式的心理学与认识论相互蕴含的建构提出了四个挑战。首先，追随雅克·拉康（Jacques Lacan）的作品，我认为由现代科学模式构成的科学主体患有妄想症。引发妄想症的并非是对主观性干扰客观性的恐惧，而是无法知晓[此处原文缺失相关内容]的真相。在此，我认为并非如达斯顿和加利森所暗示的那样，是客观性的风气驱动着认识论，而是妄想症的情感。第二个挑战基于康德自己对人类意志与道德法则之间完美对应可能性的否认。康德本人认为，没有“病理学”成分，伦理的人类行为是不可能的。这对达斯顿和加利森关于认知美德核心始终存在伦理命令的论点提出了质疑。第三个挑战对达斯顿和加利森在应用福柯的[此处原文缺失相关内容]概念来塑造主科学家自我时的方式提出了质疑。第四个挑战对达斯顿早期和后期作品中认识论形成过程中的心理学和无意识概念提出了质疑。在此背景下，我旨在提出一个主张，即在科学领域理解和揭示“实体”预设了对一般“存在”的理解。我的目标是开启关于科学家主体的另一种概念的讨论，从而开启对科学的一种情感和存在主义的表述。
