McAuliffe Katherine, Dunham Yarrow
Department of Psychology, Yale University.
J Exp Psychol Gen. 2017 Apr;146(4):485-494. doi: 10.1037/xge0000244.
Adults and children show ingroup favoritism in their 3rd-party punishment of cooperative norm violations, suggesting that group loyalty importantly shapes enforcement of cooperation. Ingroup favoritism additionally influences punishment of unfairness in the 2-party ultimatum game, in which people are directly affected by unfair behavior. However, the directionality of this relationship is unclear: In some cases, people are more forgiving of ingroup unfairness, whereas in others they are less forgiving. Here we aim to disambiguate this relationship by studying its origins in development, asking whether ingroup favoritism influences children's offers to others and whether it affects their responses to being treated unfairly. Six- to 10-year-olds played a group-based ultimatum game after being assigned to minimal groups and made proposals to-and responded to offers from-members of their in- and outgroups. We tested children's real bargaining behavior in the absence of deception. Results showed that, regardless of group membership, children's primary concern lay with fairness: Participants regularly offered equal splits and were more likely to reject unfair offers than fair offers. Consistent with past work, older children made more generous proposals than did younger children. Although our group manipulation successfully induced ingroup bias in participants, neither children's proposals nor responses were influenced by group membership. This suggests that second-party punishment of fairness norm violations is unbiased early in development and points to the potentially important role of experience with different groups in shaping later emerging bias in norm enforcement. We discuss implications for theories regarding when and to what extent group bias influences cooperation. (PsycINFO Database Record
成年人和儿童在对违反合作规范的第三方惩罚中表现出内群体偏袒,这表明群体忠诚对合作的执行具有重要影响。内群体偏袒还会影响两人最后通牒博弈中对不公平行为的惩罚,在这种博弈中人们会直接受到不公平行为的影响。然而,这种关系的方向性尚不清楚:在某些情况下,人们对群体内不公平行为更宽容,而在另一些情况下则不然。在这里,我们旨在通过研究其在发展过程中的根源来厘清这种关系,探讨内群体偏袒是否会影响儿童向他人提供的提议,以及是否会影响他们对不公平对待的反应。6至10岁的儿童在被分配到最小群体后进行了一场基于群体的最后通牒博弈,并向同群体和外群体成员提出提议并回应他们的出价。我们在没有欺骗的情况下测试了儿童的真实讨价还价行为。结果表明,无论群体成员身份如何,儿童最关心的都是公平:参与者通常会提出平分,并且比起公平出价,他们更有可能拒绝不公平出价。与过去的研究一致,年龄较大的儿童比年龄较小的儿童提出更慷慨的提议。尽管我们的群体操纵成功地在参与者中引发了内群体偏见,但儿童的提议和回应都不受群体成员身份的影响。这表明,在发展早期,对违反公平规范的第二方惩罚是无偏见的,并指出与不同群体的经历在塑造后期出现的规范执行偏见方面可能发挥的重要作用。我们讨论了这对于群体偏见何时以及在多大程度上影响合作的理论的意义。(《心理学文摘数据库记录》