Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, 275 Beacon St, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467, USA.
Sci Rep. 2024 Sep 27;14(1):22238. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-69206-9.
People often display ingroup bias in punishment, punishing outgroup members more harshly than ingroup members. However, the impact of group membership may be less pronounced when people are choosing whether to stop interacting with someone (i.e., partner rejection). In two studies (N = 1667), we investigate the impact of group membership on both response types. Participants were assigned to groups based on a "minimal" groups paradigm (Study 1) or their self-reported political positions (Study 2) and played an incentivized economic game with other players. In this game, participants (Responders) responded to other players (Deciders). In the Punishment condition, participants could decrease the Decider's bonus pay. In the Partner Rejection condition, participants could reject future interactions with the Decider. Participants played once with an ingroup member and once with an outgroup member. To control for the effects of intent and outcome, scenarios also differed based on the Decider's Intent (selfish versus fair) and the Outcome (equal versus unequal distribution of resources). Participants punished outgroup members more than ingroup members, however group membership did not influence decisions to reject partners. These results highlight partner rejection as a boundary condition for the impact of group on responses to transgressions.
人们在惩罚时常常表现出内群体偏见，对外群体成员的惩罚比对内群体成员的惩罚更为严厉。然而，当人们选择是否停止与某人互动（即拒绝伙伴）时，群体成员的影响可能不那么明显。在两项研究（N=1667）中，我们研究了群体成员对这两种反应类型的影响。参与者根据“最小群体”范式（研究 1）或他们自我报告的政治立场（研究 2）被分配到群体中，并与其他玩家进行了有奖励的经济游戏。在这个游戏中，参与者（回应者）对其他玩家（决策者）做出回应。在惩罚条件下，参与者可以减少决策者的奖金。在伙伴拒绝条件下，参与者可以拒绝与决策者未来的互动。参与者与一个内群体成员和一个外群体成员各玩一次。为了控制意图和结果的影响，根据决策者的意图（自私与公平）和结果（资源均等分配与不均等分配），情景也有所不同。参与者对外群体成员的惩罚比对内群体成员的惩罚更为严厉，然而，群体成员的身份并不影响拒绝伙伴的决定。这些结果突出了伙伴拒绝作为群体对违规行为反应的一个边界条件。
