J Med Ethics. 2017 Nov;43(11):792-796. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103857. Epub 2017 Apr 21.
In a recent paper in this journal, Jason Brennan correctly notes that libertarians struggle to justify a policy of compulsory vaccination. The most straightforward argument that justifies compulsory vaccination is that such a policy promotes welfare. But libertarians cannot make this argument because they claim that the state is justified only in protecting negative rights, not in promoting welfare. I consider two representative libertarian attempts to justify compulsory vaccination, and I argue that such arguments are unsuccessful. They either fail to show that the state is justified in implementing the policy or overgeneralise. I suggest that Brennan's solution is especially well motivated insofar as it addresses the shortcomings of these arguments. Brennan argues that we violate the rights of others by participating in an activity that imposes an unacceptable collective risk of harm. Going unvaccinated is an activity that imposes an unacceptable collective risk of harm, and thus amounts to a rights violation. So, the state can implement a policy of compulsory vaccination I object, however, that Brennan's delineation of acceptable and unacceptable risk implicitly rests on classical liberal rather than libertarian principles; he justifies compulsory vaccination on the grounds that it promotes welfare. I also object that Brennan's argument would entail significant departures from libertarian institutional arrangements. This leaves libertarians with a choice: they can develop new arguments to demonstrate that their position is compatible with compulsory vaccination, or they can accept that their view entails the impermissibility of compulsory vaccination, and argue that this is not an unpalatable implication of their view.
在最近的一篇本期刊物上,杰森·布伦南正确地指出,自由意志主义者在为强制接种疫苗的政策辩护时遇到了困难。最直接的论据是,这种政策可以促进福利。但自由意志主义者不能提出这样的论点,因为他们声称国家只在保护消极权利时是合理的,而不是在促进福利时。我考虑了两种有代表性的自由意志主义者为强制接种疫苗辩护的尝试,并认为这些论点是不成功的。它们要么未能表明国家实施该政策是合理的,要么过于笼统。我认为布伦南的解决方案特别有意义,因为它解决了这些论点的缺陷。布伦南认为,我们通过参与一种会造成不可接受的集体伤害风险的活动而侵犯了他人的权利。未接种疫苗就是一种会造成不可接受的集体伤害风险的活动,因此构成了权利侵犯。因此,国家可以实施强制接种疫苗的政策。然而,我反对的是,布伦南对可接受和不可接受风险的划分隐含地依赖于古典自由主义而不是自由意志主义原则;他为强制接种疫苗辩护的理由是它促进了福利。我还反对的是,布伦南的论点将导致与自由意志主义制度安排的重大背离。这让自由意志主义者面临一个选择:他们可以提出新的论据,证明他们的立场与强制接种疫苗是一致的,或者他们可以接受他们的观点意味着强制接种疫苗是不允许的,并认为这不是他们观点的一个不可接受的含义。