Ruseva T, Marland E, Szymanski C, Hoyle J, Marland G, Kowalczyk T
Government and Justice Studies, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608, USA; Research Institute for Environment, Energy, and Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608, USA.
Mathematical Sciences, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608, USA; Research Institute for Environment, Energy, and Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608, USA.
J Environ Manage. 2017 Aug 1;198(Pt 1):277-288. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2017.04.082. Epub 2017 May 3.
A key component of California's cap-and-trade program is the use of carbon offsets as compliance instruments for reducing statewide GHG emissions. Under this program, offsets are tradable credits representing real, verifiable, quantifiable, enforceable, permanent, and additional reductions or removals of GHG emissions. This paper focuses on the permanence and additionality standards for offset credits as defined and operationalized in California's Compliance Offset Protocol for U.S. Forest Projects. Drawing on a review of the protocol, interviews, current offset projects, and existing literature, we discuss how additionality and permanence standards relate to project participation and overall program effectiveness. Specifically, we provide an overview of offset credits as compliance instruments in California's cap-and-trade program, the timeline for a forest offset project, and the factors shaping participation in offset projects. We then discuss the implications of permanence and additionality at both the project and program levels. Largely consistent with previous work, we find that stringent standards for permanent and additional project activities can present barriers to participation, but also, that there may be a trade-off between project quality and quantity (i.e. levels of participation) when considering overall program effectiveness. We summarize what this implies for California's forest offset program and provide suggestions for improvements in light of potential program diffusion and policy learning.
加利福尼亚州总量控制与交易计划的一个关键组成部分是使用碳抵消作为减少全州温室气体排放的合规工具。在该计划下,抵消是可交易的信用额度,代表实际、可核实、可量化、可执行、永久且额外的温室气体减排或清除量。本文重点关注加利福尼亚州美国森林项目合规抵消协议中定义和实施的抵消信用额度的永久性和额外性标准。通过对该协议的审查、访谈、当前的抵消项目以及现有文献,我们讨论额外性和永久性标准如何与项目参与及整体计划有效性相关。具体而言,我们概述了加利福尼亚州总量控制与交易计划中作为合规工具的抵消信用额度、森林抵消项目的时间表以及影响抵消项目参与的因素。然后,我们讨论永久性和额外性在项目和计划层面的影响。与之前的工作基本一致,我们发现对永久性和额外项目活动的严格标准可能会成为参与的障碍,但同时,在考虑整体计划有效性时,项目质量和数量(即参与水平)之间可能存在权衡。我们总结这对加利福尼亚州森林抵消计划意味着什么,并根据潜在的计划推广和政策学习提出改进建议。