Tappin Ben M, van der Leer Leslie, McKay Ryan T
ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and Its Disorders, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London.
Regent's School of Psychotherapy and Psychology, Regent's University London.
J Exp Psychol Gen. 2017 Aug;146(8):1143-1149. doi: 10.1037/xge0000298. Epub 2017 May 29.
Understanding how individuals revise their political beliefs has important implications for society. In a preregistered study (N = 900), we experimentally separated the predictions of 2 leading theories of human belief revision-desirability bias and confirmation bias-in the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Participants indicated who they desired to win, and who they believed would win, the election. Following confrontation with evidence that was either consistent or inconsistent with their desires or beliefs, they again indicated who they believed would win. We observed a robust desirability bias-individuals updated their beliefs more if the evidence was consistent (vs. inconsistent) with their desired outcome. This bias was independent of whether the evidence was consistent or inconsistent with their prior beliefs. In contrast, we found limited evidence of an independent confirmation bias in belief updating. These results have implications for the relevant psychological theories and for political belief revision in practice. (PsycINFO Database Record
了解个体如何修正其政治信念对社会具有重要意义。在一项预先注册的研究(N = 900)中,我们在2016年美国总统大选的背景下,通过实验区分了人类信念修正的两种主要理论——愿望偏差和证实偏差——的预测。参与者指出他们希望谁赢得选举,以及他们认为谁会赢得选举。在面对与他们的愿望或信念一致或不一致的证据后,他们再次指出他们认为谁会赢得选举。我们观察到一种强烈的愿望偏差——如果证据与他们期望的结果一致(而非不一致),个体更有可能更新他们的信念。这种偏差与证据是否与他们先前的信念一致无关。相比之下,我们发现信念更新中存在独立证实偏差的证据有限。这些结果对相关心理学理论以及实践中的政治信念修正具有启示意义。(PsycINFO数据库记录)