Cavaliere Giulia
Department of Global Health & Social Medicine, King's College London, London, UK.
BMC Med Ethics. 2017 May 30;18(1):38. doi: 10.1186/s12910-017-0198-5.
This article explores the reasons in favour of revising and extending the current 14-day statutory limit to maintaining human embryos in culture. This limit is enshrined in law in over a dozen countries, including the United Kingdom. In two recently published studies (2016), scientists have shown that embryos can be sustained in vitro for about 13 days after fertilisation. Positive reactions to these results have gone hand in hand with calls for revising the 14-day rule, which only allows embryo research until the 14th day after fertilisation.
The article explores the most prominent arguments in favour of and against the extension of the 14-day limit for conducting research on human embryos. It situates these arguments within the history of the 14-day limit. I start by discussing the history of the 14-day limit in the United Kingdom and the reasons behind the decision to opt for a compromise between competing moral views. I then analyse the arguments that those who are generally in favour of embryo research put forward in support of extending the 14-day rule, namely (a) the argument of the beneficence of research and (b) the argument of technical feasibility (further explained in the article). I then show how these two arguments played a role in the recent approval of two novel techniques for the replacement of faulty mitochondrial DNA in the United Kingdom. Despite the popularity and widespread use of these arguments, I argue that they are ultimately problematic and should not be straightforwardly accepted (i.e. accepted without further scrutiny). I end by making a case for respecting value pluralism in the context of embryo research, and I present two reasons in favour of respecting value pluralism: the argument of public trust and the argument of democracy.
I argue that 14-day limit for embryo research is not a valuable tool despite being a solution of compromise, but rather because of it. The importance of respecting value pluralism (and of respecting different views on embryo research) needs to be considered in any evaluation concerning a potential change to the 14-day rule.
本文探讨了支持修订和延长当前人类胚胎体外培养14天法定时限的理由。包括英国在内的十几个国家都将这一时限写入了法律。在最近发表的两项研究(2016年)中,科学家表明,受精后胚胎能够在体外维持约13天。对这些结果的积极反应引发了修订14天规则的呼声,该规则仅允许在受精后第14天之前进行胚胎研究。
本文探讨了支持和反对延长人类胚胎研究14天时限的最主要论点。并将这些论点置于14天时限的历史背景中。我首先讨论英国14天时限的历史以及在相互竞争的道德观点之间选择折衷方案的背后原因。然后,我分析了那些总体上支持胚胎研究的人提出的支持延长14天规则的论点,即(a)研究的有益性论点和(b)技术可行性论点(本文将进一步解释)。接着,我展示了这两个论点在英国最近批准的两种用于替换有缺陷线粒体DNA的新技术中所起的作用。尽管这些论点广受欢迎且被广泛使用,但我认为它们最终存在问题,不应被直接接受(即未经进一步审查就接受)。最后,我提出在胚胎研究背景下尊重价值多元主义的理由,并给出支持尊重价值多元主义的两个理由:公众信任论点和民主论点。
我认为胚胎研究的14天时限并非一个有价值的工具,恰恰是因为它是一个折衷方案。在任何有关14天规则潜在变化的评估中,都需要考虑尊重价值多元主义(以及尊重对胚胎研究的不同观点)的重要性。