Elqayam Shira, Wilkinson Meredith R, Thompson Valerie A, Over David E, Evans Jonathan St B T
Division of Psychology, School of Applied Social Sciences, Faculty of Health and Life Sciences, De Montfort UniversityLeicester, United Kingdom.
Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, SaskatoonSK, Canada.
Front Psychol. 2017 Jun 22;8:1042. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01042. eCollection 2017.
Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations ( judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their actions ( judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism - , the tendency to infer normative ('deontic') conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference). Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive (although value-laden) premises. This family includes deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research into deontic reasoning and informal inference.
面对道德选择时，人们要么根据预先存在的义务进行判断（道义判断），要么通过考虑自身行为的后果进行判断（功利判断）。我们认为，后者与一种更普遍的认知机制——即从描述性前提推断规范性（“道义性”）结论的倾向（是-应该推理）相一致。向参与者展示了一些小场景，这些场景允许进行道义论或功利主义的选择，并要求他们得出一系列道义性结论，同时分别判断每个选择的整体道德正确性。我们预测并发现了一种模式，即抑制道义性引入的操作也会抑制功利主义道德判断，但对道义论道德判断影响不大。因此，道义性引入几乎完全与功利主义道德判断相一致。我们提出了一系列生成规范的非正式推理，其中规范性结论是从描述性（尽管带有价值倾向）前提得出的。这个系列包括道义性引入、功利主义道德判断以及其他非正式推理。我们最后呼吁将道德判断研究与道义性推理和非正式推理研究进行更大程度的整合。
