Parens Erik
Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2017;27(2):135-150. doi: 10.1353/ken.2017.0013.
There is a long-standing debate between people who can seem to be arguing "for" and "against" disability. Those arguing for have often been disability scholars and those arguing against have often been utilitarian philosophers. At least since the mid-2000s, some on both sides have sought to move beyond that debate, but that has proved difficult. Here I seek two small steps forward. One step is critical, and is aimed at we who line up "for" disability. Specifically, I suggest that the phrase "choosing disability" is misleading in at least two ways. First, when someone argues that she should be able to gestate a child who is, e.g., deaf, she does not view deafness as a disability, but as something more like an enhancement. Second, when someone else argues that no one should selectively abort fetuses with traits like deafness, she is not arguing for choosing deafness, but against making a choice based on the presence of a disabling trait. The other step is constructive, and aimed at those lined up on both sides. I suggest that we should adopt a more "binocular" approach to thinking about disability: one which, using the social and medical "lenses" on disability, helps us see it in more depth. If we get better at having a conversation about what disability is, rather than arguing for or against it, we can get better at promoting the flourishing of people with disabilities.
在那些似乎在“支持”和“反对”残疾的人之间，存在着长期的争论。支持的一方往往是残疾学者，而反对的一方往往是功利主义哲学家。至少自21世纪中叶以来，双方的一些人都试图超越这场争论，但事实证明这很困难。在这里，我寻求向前迈出两步。一步是批判性的，针对的是我们这些支持残疾的人。具体来说，我认为“选择残疾”这个短语至少在两个方面具有误导性。首先，当有人主张她应该能够孕育一个例如失聪的孩子时，她并不将失聪视为一种残疾，而是更像是一种增强。其次，当其他人主张任何人都不应该选择性地堕胎掉具有失聪等特征的胎儿时，她并不是在主张选择失聪，而是反对基于残疾特征进行选择。另一步是建设性的，针对双方的人。我建议我们应该采用一种更“双视角”的方法来思考残疾：一种方法是，利用关于残疾的社会和医学“透镜”，帮助我们更深入地看待它。如果我们在关于残疾是什么的问题上能更好地进行对话，而不是争论支持或反对它，我们就能在促进残疾人的幸福方面做得更好。
