Kittay Eva Feder
Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2017;27(2):185-215. doi: 10.1353/ken.2017.0015.
Many bioethicists try to secure a moral requirement to select against disability, while wishing to avoid denigrating disabled people. Dan Brock's arguments are representative of this attempt. Brock argues that the harm of giving birth to a disabled child when an able child could be had in its stead is a "nonperson-affecting harm." The harm is creating a world with less opportunity and more diminishment of opportunity. I argue that the presumptions that a life with disability is ceteris paribus a worse life, and that there is an inherent badness in living with a disability are contestable and fail to provide an argument that avoids the objections that disability scholars have voiced to reproductive selection against disability.
许多生物伦理学家试图确立一项针对残疾进行选择的道德要求，同时又希望避免诋毁残疾人。丹·布罗克的论点就是这种尝试的代表。布罗克认为，在本可以生育一个健全孩子的情况下却生育一个残疾孩子，这种伤害是一种“非个体影响性伤害”。这种伤害在于创造了一个机会更少且机会被更多剥夺的世界。我认为，认为在其他条件相同的情况下残疾人生的生活更糟糕，以及认为残疾生活本身存在固有坏处的假设是有争议的，并且无法提供一个能避免残疾学者对针对残疾的生殖选择所提出的反对意见的论据。
