Anstey K W
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Department of Philosophy, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia 3010.
J Med Ethics. 2002 Oct;28(5):286-8. doi: 10.1136/jme.28.5.286.
In a recent case, artificial insemination was employed by a couple in an attempt to ensure the birth of a deaf child. In response to this, I argue that individuals should not be allowed to select for or against deafness. While I establish that preferences for deaf children can be inherently just, allowing individuals to secure these preferences may have unacceptable consequences for existing persons who are deaf. I show that these follow even granting this couple's contestable understanding of the deaf as a minority group.
在最近的一个案例中,一对夫妇采用人工授精的方式,试图确保生下一个失聪的孩子。对此,我认为不应允许个人选择生育失聪或不失聪的孩子。虽然我认为对失聪儿童的偏好本质上可能是合理的,但允许个人实现这些偏好可能会给现有的失聪者带来不可接受的后果。我表明,即便认可这对夫妇将失聪者视为少数群体这一有争议的观点,这些后果依然会出现。