Singapore Management University.
Br J Sociol. 2017 Dec;68(4):718-753. doi: 10.1111/1468-4446.12270. Epub 2017 Aug 21.
What motivates corporate political action? Are corporations motivated by their own narrow economic self-interest; are they committed to pursuing larger class interests; or are corporations instruments for status groups to pursue their own agendas? Sociologists have been divided over this question for much of the last century. This paper introduces a novel case - that of Australia - and an extensive dataset of over 1,500 corporations and 7,500 directors. The paper attempts to understand the motives of corporate political action by examining patterns of corporate political donations. Using statistical modelling, supported by qualitative evidence, the paper argues that, in the Australian case, corporate political action is largely motivated by the narrow economic self-interest of individual corporations. Firms' interests are, consistent with regulatory environment theory, defined by the nature of government regulation in their industry: those in highly regulated industries (such as banking) and those dependent on government support (such as defence) tend to adopt a strategy of hedging their political support, and make bipartisan donations (to both major parties). In contrast, firms facing hostile regulation (such as timber or mining), and those without strong dependence on state support (such as small companies) tend to adopt a strategy of conservative partisanship, and make conservative-only donations. This paper argues that regulatory environment theory needs to be modified to incorporate greater emphasis on the subjective political judgements of corporations facing hostile regulation: a corporation's adoption of conservative partisanship or hedging is not just a product of the objective regulation they face, but also whether corporate leaders judge such regulation as politically inevitable or something that can be resisted. Such a judgement is highly subjective, introducing a dynamic and unpredictable dimension to corporate political action.
是什么推动了企业的政治行为？企业是出于自身狭隘的经济利益；是为了追求更大的阶级利益；还是企业只是地位群体追求自身议程的工具？在过去的一个世纪里，社会学家一直在这个问题上存在分歧。本文介绍了一个新的案例——澳大利亚，以及一个由超过 1500 家公司和 7500 名董事组成的广泛数据集。本文试图通过考察公司政治捐赠的模式来理解公司政治行为的动机。本文使用统计建模，并辅以定性证据，认为在澳大利亚的情况下，企业的政治行为主要是出于单个企业自身狭隘的经济利益。正如监管环境理论所定义的那样，企业的利益取决于其所在行业的政府监管性质：处于高度监管行业（如银行业）和依赖政府支持的企业（如国防）往往采取对冲政治支持的策略，并进行两党捐赠（向两个主要政党都捐赠）。相比之下，面临敌对监管的企业（如木材或采矿业）和没有强烈依赖国家支持的企业（如小公司）往往采取保守党派立场的策略，只进行保守派捐赠。本文认为，监管环境理论需要进行修改，以更加重视面临敌对监管的企业的主观政治判断：企业采取保守党派立场或对冲策略不仅是其面临的客观监管的产物，还取决于企业领导人是否认为这种监管是政治上不可避免的，或者是可以抵制的。这种判断是高度主观的，为企业政治行为引入了一个动态和不可预测的维度。
