Oregon State University.
Br J Sociol. 2018 Jun;69(2):265-285. doi: 10.1111/1468-4446.12281. Epub 2017 Aug 22.
Thirty-five years ago, Gillian Rose articulated a significant critique of classical sociological reason, emphasizing its relationship to its philosophical forebears. In a series of works, but most significantly in her Hegel contra Sociology, Rose worked to specify the implications of sociology's failure, both in its critical Marxist and its 'scientific' forms, to move beyond Kant and to fully come to terms with the thought of Hegel. In this article, I unpack and explain the substance of her criticisms, developing the necessary Hegelian philosophical background on which she founded them. I argue that Rose's attempted recuperation of 'speculative reason' for social theory remains little understood, despite its continued relevance to contemporary debates concerning the nature and scope of sociological reason. As an illustration, I employ Rose to critique Chernilo's recent call for a more philosophically sophisticated sociology. From the vantage point of Rose, this particular account of a 'philosophical sociology' remains abstract and rooted in the neo-Kantian contradictions that continue to characterize sociology.
三十五年前，吉莉安·罗斯（Gillian Rose）对古典社会学理性进行了重要批判，强调了它与其哲学前辈的关系。在一系列著作中，尤其是在她的《黑格尔反对社会学》一书中，罗斯致力于具体说明社会学的失败所带来的影响，无论是在其批判的马克思主义形式还是“科学”形式中，社会学都未能超越康德，也未能完全接受黑格尔的思想。在本文中，我将详细说明并解释她的批评的实质，阐述她以此为基础的必要的黑格尔哲学背景。我认为，尽管罗斯试图为社会理论恢复“思辨理性”的观点仍然鲜为人知，但它对于当前关于社会学理性的性质和范围的争论仍然具有重要意义。作为例证，我利用罗斯的观点来批判切尔尼洛最近呼吁进行更具哲学深度的社会学研究。从罗斯的角度来看，这种关于“哲学社会学”的解释仍然是抽象的，并且根植于继续影响社会学的新康德主义矛盾之中。
