Suzuki Daichi G, Tanaka Senji
The Nobel Institute for Neurophysiology, Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, Sweden.
Faculty of Letters, Keio University, Minato, Tokyo, Japan.
Biol Theory. 2017;12(3):169-180. doi: 10.1007/s13752-017-0265-7. Epub 2017 May 22.
Homology is a fundamental concept in biology. However, the metaphysical status of homology, especially whether a homolog is a part of an individual or a member of a natural kind, is still a matter of intense debate. The proponents of the individuality view of homology criticize the natural kind view of homology by pointing out that homologs are subject to evolutionary transformation, and natural kinds do not change in the evolutionary process. Conversely, some proponents of the natural kind view of homology argue that a homolog can be construed as a part of an individual a member of a natural kind. They adopt the Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) theory of natural kinds, and the theory seems to strongly support their construal. Note that this construal implies the acceptance of essentialism. However, looking back on the history of the concept of homology, we should not overlook the fact that the individuality view was proposed to reject the essentialist interpretation of homology. Moreover, the essentialist notions of natural kinds can, in our view, mislead biologists about the phenomena of homology. Consequently, we need a essentialist view of homology, which we name the "persistently reproducible module" (PRM) view. This view highlights both the individual-like and kind-like aspects of homologs while stripping down both essentialist and anti-essentialist interpretations of homology. In this article, we articulate the PRM view of homology and explain why it is recommended over the other two views.
同源性是生物学中的一个基本概念。然而，同源性的形而上学地位，尤其是同源物是个体的一部分还是自然类别的成员，仍然是一个激烈争论的问题。同源性个体性观点的支持者通过指出同源物会经历进化转变，而自然类别在进化过程中不会改变，来批评同源性的自然类别观点。相反，一些同源性自然类别观点的支持者认为，同源物可以被理解为个体的一部分或自然类别的成员。他们采用自然类别的稳态属性簇（HPC）理论，而该理论似乎有力地支持了他们的理解。需要注意的是，这种理解意味着接受本质主义。然而，回顾同源性概念的历史，我们不应忽视这样一个事实，即个体性观点的提出是为了拒绝同源性的本质主义解释。此外，在我们看来，自然类别的本质主义观念可能会在同源性现象方面误导生物学家。因此，我们需要一种关于同源性的非本质主义观点，我们将其称为“持续可复制模块”（PRM）观点。这种观点既突出了同源物类似个体和类似类别的方面，同时又摒弃了同源性的本质主义和反本质主义解释。在本文中，我们阐述了同源性的PRM观点，并解释了为什么它比其他两种观点更值得推荐。
