Severini Eleonora, Sterpetti Fabio
Department of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, Via Carlo Fea 2, 00161, Rome, Italy.
Hist Philos Life Sci. 2017 Sep 12;39(3):27. doi: 10.1007/s40656-017-0154-1.
The aim of this article is to explore the impact of Darwinism in metaethics and dispel some of the confusion surrounding it. While the prospects for a Darwinian metaethics appear to be improving, some underlying epistemological issues remain unclear. We will focus on the so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) which, when applied in metaethics, are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs so as to undermine their epistemic justification. The point is that an epistemic disanalogy can be identified in the debate on EDAs between moral beliefs and other kinds of beliefs, insofar as only the former are regarded as vulnerable to EDAs. First, we will analyze some significant debunking positions in metaethics in order to show that they do not provide adequate justification for such an epistemic disanalogy. Then, we will assess whether they can avoid the accusation of being epistemically incoherent by adopting the same evolutionary account for all kinds of beliefs. In other words, once it is argued that Darwinism has a corrosive impact on metaethics, what if its universal acid cannot be contained?
本文旨在探讨达尔文主义在元伦理学中的影响，并消除围绕它的一些困惑。虽然达尔文式元伦理学的前景似乎正在改善，但一些潜在的认识论问题仍不明确。我们将聚焦于所谓的进化揭穿论证（EDAs），当它应用于元伦理学时，被定义为诉诸道德信念的进化起源以削弱其认知正当性的论证。关键在于，在关于EDAs的辩论中，可以在道德信念和其他类型的信念之间识别出一种认知上的不类比，因为只有前者被认为容易受到EDAs的影响。首先，我们将分析元伦理学中一些重要的揭穿立场，以表明它们没有为这种认知上的不类比提供充分的正当理由。然后，我们将评估它们是否可以通过对所有类型的信念采用相同的进化解释来避免被指责在认知上不一致。换句话说，一旦有人认为达尔文主义对元伦理学有腐蚀性影响，要是它的“万能酸”无法被遏制会怎样呢？
