Kahane Guy
University of Oxford.
Nous. 2011 Mar;45(1):103-125. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x.
Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs-a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with a parallel and more sweeping global evolutionary debunking argument that has been discussed in recent metaethics. After examining several ways of responding to this global debunking argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook.
进化揭穿论证（EDAs）是诉诸评价性信念的进化起源以削弱其正当性的论证。本文旨在阐明EDAs的前提和预设——一种在规范伦理学中越来越多地被使用的论证形式。我认为这类论证面临严重障碍。例如，人们常常忽视它们预设了元伦理客观主义的真理。更重要的是，即使假定了客观主义，在规范伦理学中使用EDAs也与近期元伦理学中讨论的一个并行且更具普遍性的全球进化揭穿论证不相容。在考察了几种回应这个全球揭穿论证的方式后，我最后指出，即使我们能够抵制它，鉴于如果EDAs确实起作用，它们无论如何都会导致我们评价性观点的真正彻底修正，这仍然无法恢复目前在规范伦理学中对EDAs的针对性使用。
