The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA.
Hist Philos Life Sci. 2022 Jun 1;44(2):23. doi: 10.1007/s40656-022-00505-y.
The causal premise of the evolutionary debunking argument contends that human moral beliefs are explained by the process of natural selection. While it is universally acknowledged that such a premise is fundamental to the debunker's case, the vast majority of philosophers focus instead on the epistemic premise that natural selection does not track moral truth and the resulting skeptical conclusion(s). Recently, however, some have begun to concentrate on the causal premise. So far, the upshot of this small but growing literature has been that the causal premise is likely false due to the seemingly persuasive evidence that our moral beliefs are in fact not the result of natural selection. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. Specifically, I advocate the Innate Biases Model, which contends that there is not only compelling evidence for an evolved cognitive capacity for acquiring norms but also for the existence of an evolutionarily instilled set of cognitive biases that make it either more or less likely that we adopt certain moral beliefs.
进化拆穿论点的因果前提认为，人类的道德信仰是由自然选择过程解释的。虽然普遍认为这样的前提是拆穿论点的基础，但绝大多数哲学家更关注的是自然选择不遵循道德真理的认识前提，以及由此产生的怀疑结论。然而，最近有些人开始关注因果前提。到目前为止，这一小部分但不断增长的文献的结果是，由于似乎令人信服的证据表明，我们的道德信仰实际上不是自然选择的结果，因此因果前提很可能是错误的。在本文中，我认为这种观点是错误的。具体来说，我主张先天偏见模型，该模型认为，不仅有令人信服的证据表明存在一种进化的认知能力来获取规范，而且还存在一套进化所灌输的认知偏见，这些偏见使我们更有可能或更不可能接受某些道德信仰。
