Richman Kenneth A, Bidshahri Raya
Bioethics. 2018 Jan;32(1):43-49. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12370. Epub 2017 Sep 15.
Whether to treat autism as exculpatory in any given circumstance appears to be influenced both by models of autism and by theories of moral responsibility. This article looks at one particular combination of theories: autism as theory of mind challenges and moral responsibility as requiring appropriate experience of the reactive attitudes. In pursuing this particular combination of ideas, we do not intend to endorse them. Our goal is, instead, to explore the implications of this combination of especially prominent ideas about autism and about moral responsibility. These implications can be quite serious and practical for autists and those who interact directly with autists, as well as for broader communities as they attend to the fair, compassionate, and respectful treatment of increasing numbers of autistic adults. We find that these theories point to a limited range of situations in which autists should not be blamed for transgressive actions for which neurotypical individuals should be blamed. We build on what others have written on these issues by bringing in a recent cognitive model of the role theory of mind plays in empathy, by discussing the social implications of the theoretical findings, and by raising questions about the compatibility of reactive attitude theories of moral responsibility with the neurodiversity approach to autism.
在任何特定情况下，是否将自闭症视为免责因素似乎既受自闭症模型的影响，也受道德责任理论的影响。本文探讨了一种特定的理论组合：将自闭症视为心智理论挑战，将道德责任视为需要有适当的反应态度体验。在探讨这种特定的思想组合时，我们并非打算支持它们。相反，我们的目标是探究这种关于自闭症和道德责任的特别突出的思想组合所带来的影响。这些影响对于自闭症患者以及那些直接与自闭症患者互动的人来说可能相当严重且具有现实意义，对于更广泛的社区而言，当他们关注如何公正、富有同情心且尊重地对待越来越多的成年自闭症患者时也是如此。我们发现，这些理论指出了在有限的一系列情况下，自闭症患者不应因那些神经典型个体应受责备的违规行为而受到责备。我们在他人关于这些问题的论述基础上进行拓展，引入了一种关于心智理论在共情中所起作用的最新认知模型，讨论了理论研究结果的社会影响，并对道德责任的反应态度理论与自闭症的神经多样性方法的兼容性提出了疑问。
