Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
660 Owen G Glenn Building, 12 rafton Road, Auckland, 1142, New Zealand.
Sci Rep. 2017 Sep 25;7(1):12286. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-12490-5.
We use decision-making experiments with human participants to study cooperation in a laboratory public goods game. Such games pose a conflict between cooperating, which is socially optimal and free-riding, which promotes individual self-interest. Prior research emphasizes the need for de-centralized peer-to-peer punishments as an evolutionarily stable response to the problem of free-riding, especially where interactions occur over long horizons. We show that a simple exhortative message appealing to participants' goodwill can achieve high rates of cooperation in social dilemmas played over many rounds, even in the absence of punishments for free-riding.
我们利用有人类参与者参与的决策实验来研究实验室公共物品博弈中的合作。此类博弈存在合作（对社会而言是最优的）与搭便车（促进个人自利）之间的冲突。先前的研究强调需要去中心化的点对点惩罚，作为对搭便车问题的一种进化稳定的反应，特别是在交互作用发生在很长的时间跨度内的情况下。我们表明，一个简单的呼吁性信息，呼吁参与者的善意，就可以在许多轮的社会困境中实现高合作率，即使没有对搭便车行为的惩罚。
