Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
Department of Economics and Harvard School of Business, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
Am Econ Rev. 2012 Aug;102(5):2018-47. doi: 10.1257/aer.102.5.2018.
Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.
在美国，大多数移植器官都来自已故捐赠者，一位已故捐赠者可以通过提供多个器官来挽救许多生命。然而，尽管成为器官捐赠者相对容易，但大多数美国人并未登记成为器官捐赠者。我们在实验室中研究了一种模拟登记为器官捐赠者决策的实验游戏，并调查器官等待名单管理的变化如何影响捐赠。我们发现，一种将等待名单上的优先权给予之前已登记为捐赠者的器官分配政策，对登记有显著的积极影响。
