Findlay C S, Lumsden C J, Hansell R I
Department of Biology, University of Ottawa, ON, Canada.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 1989 Jan;86(2):568-72. doi: 10.1073/pnas.86.2.568.
We consider an evolutionary game model in which strategies are transmitted culturally from parents to offspring rather than inherited biologically. Our analysis yields two noteworthy results. First, biocultural games show a greater diversity of dynamical behaviors than their purely biological counterparts, including multiple fully polymorphic equilibria. Second, biocultural games on average exhibit greater equilibrium strategy diversity because of the countervailing influences of cultural transmission and natural selection. Therefore, knowledge of a strategy's influence on Darwinian fitness is not sufficient to infer the evolutionary consequences of biocultural games. Further, our results suggest that cultural transmission in the presence of natural selection may be an important mechanism maintaining behavioral diversity in natural populations.
我们考虑一种进化博弈模型，其中策略是通过文化从父母传递给后代，而非通过生物遗传。我们的分析得出了两个值得注意的结果。首先，生物文化博弈比其纯粹的生物对应物表现出更多样化的动态行为，包括多个完全多态均衡。其次，由于文化传播和自然选择的相互抵消影响，生物文化博弈平均表现出更大的均衡策略多样性。因此，了解一种策略对达尔文适应性的影响不足以推断生物文化博弈的进化后果。此外，我们的结果表明，在自然选择存在的情况下，文化传播可能是维持自然种群行为多样性的重要机制。
