Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA.
Am Econ Rev. 2006 Sep;96(4):938-58.
We demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long-term care insurance market. Two types of people purchase insurance: individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance. Ex post, the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect, while the latter are lower risk. In aggregate, those with more insurance are not higher risk. Our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence. The results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information.
我们证明了长期护理保险市场中存在多种私人信息维度。有两种人购买保险：一种是有私人信息的人，他们是高风险的；另一种是有私人信息的人，他们对保险有强烈的偏好。事后看来，前者的风险高于保险公司的预期，而后者的风险则低于保险公司的预期。总的来说，那些购买保险更多的人并不是更高风险的人。我们的结果表明，即使保险覆盖范围和风险发生之间没有正相关关系，保险市场也可能存在信息不对称。这些结果还表明了一种用于检验信息不对称的一般方法。
