Menshikov Ivan S, Shklover Alexsandr V, Babkina Tatiana S, Myagkov Mikhail G
Department of Control and Applied Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (State University), Moscow, Moscow Region, Russian Federation.
Department of Mathematical Modeling of Economic Systems, Dorodnicyn Computing Center, Federal Research Center «Computer Science and Control» of Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, Moscow Region, Russian Federation.
PLoS One. 2017 Nov 30;12(11):e0180754. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0180754. eCollection 2017.
In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma prior to social interaction. However, quantal response equilibrium does not explain of participants' behavior after social interaction. As an alternative theoretical approach, an examination was conducted of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game in Markov strategies. We built a totally mixed Nash equilibrium in this game; the equilibrium agrees with the results of the experiments both before and after social interaction.
在本研究中，基于量子响应均衡概念以及马尔可夫策略中博弈的表示，对囚徒困境实验室游戏中参与者的社会行为进行了解释。在先前的研究中，我们证明了实验期间的社会互动对合作、信任和感恩有积极影响。本研究表明，量子响应均衡概念仅与社会互动之前囚徒困境合作实验的结果相符。然而，量子响应均衡并不能解释社会互动后参与者的行为。作为一种替代的理论方法，我们对马尔可夫策略中的重复囚徒困境博弈进行了考察。我们在该博弈中构建了一个完全混合纳什均衡；该均衡与社会互动前后的实验结果均相符。
