Ortiz-Millán Gustavo
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, Mexico.
Glob Bioeth. 2017 Dec 8;29(1):1-15. doi: 10.1080/11287462.2017.1411224. eCollection 2018.
Since 2007, when Mexico City decriminalized abortion during the first trimester, a debate has been taking place regarding abortion and the right to conscientious objection (CO). Many people argue that, since the provision of abortions (or "legal terminations of pregnancy" as they are called under Mexico City's law) is now a statutory duty of healthcare personnel there can be no place for "conscientious objection." Others claim that, even if such an objection were to be allowed, it should not be seen as a right, since talk about a right to CO may lead to a slippery slope where we may end up recognizing a right to disobey the law. In this paper, I argue that there a right to CO and that this may be justified through the notions of autonomy and integrity, which a liberal democracy should respect. However, it cannot be an absolute right, and in the case of abortion, it conflicts with women's reproductive rights. Therefore, CO should be carefully regulated so that it does not obstruct the exercise of women's reproductive rights. Regulation should address questions about who is entitled to object, how such objection should take place, and what can legitimately be objected to.
自2007年墨西哥城将孕早期堕胎合法化以来,关于堕胎和良心拒服兵役权(CO)的争论就一直在进行。许多人认为,既然提供堕胎服务(或如墨西哥城法律所称的“合法终止妊娠”)现在是医护人员的法定义务,那么就不可能有“良心拒服兵役”的空间。另一些人则声称,即使允许这种异议,也不应将其视为一项权利,因为谈论良心拒服兵役权可能会导致一种滑坡效应,最终我们可能会认可违法的权利。在本文中,我认为存在良心拒服兵役权,并且这可以通过自主性和完整性的概念来证明其合理性,而自由民主应该尊重这些概念。然而,它不可能是一项绝对权利,在堕胎问题上,它与女性的生殖权利相冲突。因此,良心拒服兵役应该受到严格监管,以免妨碍女性生殖权利的行使。监管应解决以下问题:谁有权提出异议、这种异议应如何提出以及可以合法反对的内容是什么。