Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Allied Health Sciences, School of Health and Social Care, London South Bank University, London, UK.
J Med Ethics. 2020 Mar;46(3):178-182. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105566. Epub 2019 Aug 31.
Conscientious objection in healthcare has come under heavy criticism on two grounds recently, particularly regarding abortion provision. First, critics claim conscientious objection involves a refusal to provide a legal and beneficial procedure requested by a patient, denying them access to healthcare. Second, they argue the exercise of conscientious objection is based on unverifiable personal beliefs. These characteristics, it is claimed, disqualify conscientious objection in healthcare. Here, we defend conscientious objection in the context of abortion provision. We show that abortion has a dubitable claim to be medically beneficial, is rarely clinically indicated, and that conscientious objections should be accepted in these circumstances. We also show that reliance on personal beliefs is difficult to avoid if any form of objection is to be permitted, even if it is based on criteria such as the principles and values of the profession or the scope of professional practice.
最近，医疗保健中的良心拒绝在两个方面受到了强烈的批评，尤其是在堕胎服务方面。首先，批评者声称，良心拒绝涉及拒绝提供患者要求的合法和有益的程序，使他们无法获得医疗保健。其次，他们认为，行使良心拒绝是基于无法核实的个人信仰。据称，这些特征使医疗保健中的良心拒绝失去资格。在这里，我们在堕胎服务的背景下为良心拒绝辩护。我们表明，堕胎在医学上有益的说法值得怀疑，很少有临床指征，在这些情况下应该接受良心拒绝。我们还表明，如果要允许任何形式的反对，即使是基于职业的原则和价值观或职业实践的范围等标准，那么依赖个人信仰是很难避免的。
