Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027;
Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2018 Jan 30;115(5):933-938. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1714171115. Epub 2018 Jan 16.
How much do people lie, and how much do people trust communication when lying is possible? An important step toward answering these questions is understanding how communication is interpreted. This paper establishes in a canonical experiment that competition can alter the shared communication code: the commonly understood meaning of messages. We study a sender-receiver game in which the sender dictates how to share $10 with the receiver, if the receiver participates. The receiver has an outside option and decides whether to participate after receiving a nonbinding offer from the sender. Competition for play between senders leads to higher offers but has no effect on actual transfers, expected transfers, or receivers' willingness to play. The higher offers signal that sharing will be equitable without the expectation that they should be followed literally: Under competition "6 is the new 5."
人们会说谎的程度有多少?在存在说谎可能的情况下,人们对沟通的信任程度又有多少?要回答这些问题,重要的一步是理解沟通是如何被解读的。本文通过一个规范的实验证明,竞争可以改变共享的交流代码:即信息的普遍含义。我们研究了一个发送者-接收者的博弈,在这个博弈中,如果接收者参与,发送者决定如何与接收者分享 10 美元。接收者有一个外部选择,并在收到发送者的非约束性报价后决定是否参与。发送者之间的竞争导致了更高的报价,但对实际转账、预期转账或接收者参与的意愿没有影响。更高的报价表明,在没有期望它们被严格执行的情况下,分享将是公平的:在竞争下,“6 是新的 5”。