VanEpps Eric M, Troxel Andrea B, Villamil Elizabeth, Saulsgiver Kathryn A, Zhu Jingsan, Chin Jo-Yu, Matson Jacqueline, Anarella Joseph, Roohan Patrick, Gesten Foster, Volpp Kevin G
1 David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA.
2 Department of Population Health, New York University School of Medicine, New York, NY, USA.
Am J Health Promot. 2018 Sep;32(7):1537-1543. doi: 10.1177/0890117117753986. Epub 2018 Feb 1.
To identify whether financial incentives promote improved disease management in Medicaid recipients diagnosed with hypertension or diabetes, respectively.
Four-group, multicenter, randomized clinical trials.
Between 2013 and 2016, New York State Medicaid managed care members diagnosed with hypertension (N = 920) or with diabetes (N = 959).
Participants in each 6-month trial were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 arms: (1) process incentives-earned by attending primary care visits and/or receiving prescription medication refills, (2) outcome incentives-earned by reducing systolic blood pressure (hypertension) or hemoglobin A (HbA; diabetes) levels, (3) combined process and outcome incentives, and (4) control (no incentives).
Systolic blood pressure (hypertension) and HbA (diabetes) levels, primary care visits, and medication prescription refills. Analysis and Results: At 6 months, there were no statistically significant differences between intervention arms and the control arm in the change in systolic blood pressure, P = .531. Similarly, there were no significant differences in blood glucose control (HbA) between the intervention arms and control after 6 months, P = .939. The majority of participants had acceptable systolic blood pressure (<140 mm Hg) or blood glucose (<8.0%) levels at baseline and throughout the study.
Financial incentives-regardless of whether they were delivered based on disease-relevant outcomes, process activities, or a combination of the two-have a negligible impact on health outcomes for Medicaid recipients diagnosed with either hypertension or diabetes in 2 studies in which, among other design and operational limitations, the majority of recipients had relatively well-controlled diseases at the time of enrollment.
分别确定经济激励措施是否能促进医疗补助计划中被诊断患有高血压或糖尿病的受助者改善疾病管理。
四组多中心随机临床试验。
2013年至2016年期间,纽约州医疗补助计划管理式医疗的成员,其中被诊断患有高血压的有920人,患有糖尿病的有959人。
在每项为期6个月的试验中,参与者被随机分配到4组中的一组:(1)过程激励——通过参加初级保健就诊和/或接受处方药续方获得;(2)结果激励——通过降低收缩压(高血压)或糖化血红蛋白(HbA;糖尿病)水平获得;(3)过程与结果相结合的激励;(4)对照组(无激励)。
收缩压(高血压)和HbA(糖尿病)水平、初级保健就诊次数以及药物处方续方情况。分析与结果:6个月时,干预组和对照组在收缩压变化方面无统计学显著差异,P = 0.531。同样,6个月后干预组和对照组在血糖控制(HbA)方面也无显著差异,P = 0.939。大多数参与者在基线时以及整个研究过程中收缩压(<140 mmHg)或血糖(<8.0%)水平均可接受。
在两项研究中,无论经济激励措施是基于与疾病相关的结果、过程活动还是两者结合来实施,对于被诊断患有高血压或糖尿病的医疗补助计划受助者的健康结果影响都微乎其微。在这两项研究中,除了其他设计和操作上的局限性外,大多数受助者在入组时疾病控制情况相对良好。