School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, PR China.
Library, Yunnan Normal University, Kunming, Yunnan, PR China.
PLoS One. 2018 Feb 16;13(2):e0193151. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193151. eCollection 2018.
Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase. Through numerical simulation, we have shown that voluntary participation could effectively promote the fraction of cooperation, which is also affected by the value of increment. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of the increment value on the density of different strategies and find that there exists an optimal increment value that plays an utmost role on the evolutionary dynamics. With regard to this observation, we unveil that an optimal value of increment can lead to strongest heterogeneity in agents' teaching ability, further promoting the evolution of cooperation.
自愿参与作为重复博弈中涉及的额外策略，已被证明是从理论和经验上促进合作进化的有效方法。此外，当前的研究表明，教学活动的共同进化可以促进合作。因此，受上述启发，我们研究了教学活动的共同进化对囚徒困境博弈中合作进化的影响：当焦点玩家成功地将其策略应用于对手时，他的教学能力将会得到提高。通过数值模拟，我们表明自愿参与可以有效地促进合作的比例，这也受到增量值的影响。此外，我们研究了增量值对不同策略密度的影响，发现存在一个最佳的增量值，对进化动力学起着至关重要的作用。通过观察，我们揭示了最佳的增量值可以导致代理人教学能力的最强异质性，从而进一步促进合作的进化。
