Vlaev Ivo, Wallace Brian, Wright Nicholas, Nicolle Antoinette, Dolan Paul, Dolan Raymond
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick.
Department of Economics, University College London.
J Neurosci Psychol Econ. 2017 Jun-Sep;10(2-3):59-80. doi: 10.1037/npe0000063.
Many important decisions are taken not by the person who will ultimately gain or lose from the outcome, but on their behalf, by somebody else. We examined economic decision-making about risk and time in situations in which deciders chose for others who also chose for them. We propose that this unique setting, which has not been studied before, elicits perception of reciprocity that prompts a unique bias in preferences. We found that decision-makers are less patient (more discounting), and more risk averse for losses than gains, with other peoples' money, especially when their choices for others are more uncertain. Those results were derived by exploiting a computational modeling framework that has been shown to account for the underlying psychological and neural decision processes. We propose a novel theoretical mechanism-precautionary preferences under social uncertainty, which explains the findings. Implications for future research and alternative models are also discussed.
许多重要决策并非由最终会从结果中获利或受损的人做出,而是由其他人代表他们做出。我们研究了在决策者为他人做出选择,而这些人也为决策者做出选择的情况下,关于风险和时间的经济决策。我们提出,这种前所未有的独特情境会引发互惠感知,从而导致偏好出现独特偏差。我们发现,决策者在处理他人的资金时,尤其是当他们为他人做出的选择更不确定时,会变得更缺乏耐心(贴现更多),对损失比收益更厌恶风险。这些结果是通过利用一个计算建模框架得出的,该框架已被证明能够解释潜在的心理和神经决策过程。我们提出了一种新的理论机制——社会不确定性下的预防性偏好,用以解释这些发现。同时还讨论了对未来研究的启示以及替代模型。