Hastings Cent Rep. 2018 Jan;48(1):43-44. doi: 10.1002/hast.811.
In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Daniel Brudney suggests that clinicians have an overly deferential attitude toward their patients' surrogate decision-makers that is rooted in a wrongful investment of moral authority. He maintains that surrogate decision-makers have no moral right to decide for their loved ones and that their value in the decision-making process is limited to their knowledge of their loved one's preferences. If operationalized, Brudney's framework would ease the way for clinicians to remove a surrogate who cannot provide information relevant to the patient's preferences and to resort to a paternalistic model of decision-making. Brudney fails to consider that the value of the surrogate does not flow from the surrogate, but rather from the patient's moral claim to have decisions made for him or her by a loved one. This claim recognizes that surrogates have intrinsic value through their relationship to and knowledge of the patient. Bioethics consultation services can assist clinical teams in engaging with the human crowd that surrounds each patient and navigating conflicting values and goals. This relational approach embraces the "mire and blood" that is endemic to relationships and clinical encounters.
在本期《 Hastings 中心报告》中,丹尼尔·布鲁德尼(Daniel Brudney)认为,临床医生对患者的代理人决策者过于顺从,这源于对道德权威的错误投资。他坚持认为,代理人决策者没有为亲人做决定的道德权利,他们在决策过程中的价值仅限于他们对亲人偏好的了解。如果实施布鲁德尼的框架,将为临床医生省去更换无法提供与患者偏好相关信息的代理人的麻烦,并采用家长式的决策模式。布鲁德尼没有考虑到,代理人的价值不是来自代理人本身,而是来自患者要求其亲人代表他或她做出决定的道德主张。这一主张承认,代理人通过与患者的关系以及对患者的了解,具有内在价值。生物伦理学咨询服务可以帮助临床团队与每位患者周围的人群互动,并处理冲突的价值观和目标。这种关系方法包含了关系和临床接触中固有的“困境和血腥”。