Rodger Daniel, Blackshaw Bruce P, Miller Calum
a School of Health and Social Care , London South Bank University , London , UK.
b Independent Philosopher , London , UK.
New Bioeth. 2018 Jul;24(2):106-121. doi: 10.1080/20502877.2018.1438771. Epub 2018 Feb 21.
It is commonly argued that a serious right to life is grounded only in actual, relatively advanced psychological capacities a being has acquired. The moral permissibility of abortion is frequently argued for on these grounds. Increasingly it is being argued that such accounts also entail the permissibility of infanticide, with several proponents of these theories accepting this consequence. We show, however, that these accounts imply the permissibility of even more unpalatable acts than infanticide performed on infants: organ harvesting, live experimentation, sexual interference, and discriminatory killing. The stronger intuitions against the permissibility of these 'pre-personal acts' allow us to re-establish a comprehensive and persuasive reductio against psychological accounts of persons.
人们通常认为，严重的生命权仅基于一个人所获得的实际的、相对高级的心理能力。基于这些理由，人们经常为堕胎的道德可允许性进行论证。越来越多的人认为，这样的解释也意味着杀婴是可允许的，这些理论的几位支持者接受了这一结果。然而，我们表明，这些解释所暗示的可允许行为，比针对婴儿实施的杀婴行为更令人难以接受：器官摘取、活体实验、性侵犯和歧视性杀戮。对这些“前人格行为”可允许性的更强烈直觉，使我们能够重新确立一个全面且有说服力的归谬法，以反对关于人的心理解释。
