Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Am Econ Rev. 2018 Oct;105(10):2986-3029. doi: 10.1257/aer.20110108.
We provide a life-cycle framework for comparing insurance and disincentive effects of disability benefits. The risks that individuals face and the parameters of the Disability Insurance (DI ) program are estimated from consumption, health, disability insurance, and wage data. We characterize the effects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and welfare. DI features high rejection rates of disabled applicants and some acceptance of healthy applicants. Despite worse incentives, welfare increases as programs become less strict or generosity increases. Disability insurance interacts with welfare programs: making unconditional means-tested programs more generous improves disability insurance targeting and increases welfare.
我们提供了一个生命周期框架，用于比较残疾福利的保险和抑制效应。从消费、健康、残疾保险和工资数据中估计个人面临的风险和残疾保险 (DI) 计划的参数。我们描述了残疾保险的影响，并研究了政策改革如何影响行为和福利。DI 的特点是残疾申请人的高拒绝率和一些健康申请人的接受率。尽管激励措施较差，但随着计划变得不那么严格或慷慨程度增加，福利会增加。残疾保险与福利计划相互作用：使无条件的基于收入的计划更加慷慨，会提高残疾保险的针对性并增加福利。
