Vonasch Andrew J, Baumeister Roy F, Mele Alfred R
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States.
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, United States; School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Australia.
Conscious Cogn. 2018 Apr;60:133-151. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.03.002. Epub 2018 Mar 16.
Four experiments supported the hypothesis that ordinary people understand free will as meaning unconstrained choice, not having a soul. People consistently rated free will as being high unless reduced by internal constraints (i.e., things that impaired people's mental abilities to make choices) or external constraints (i.e., situations that hampered people's abilities to choose and act as they desired). Scientific paradigms that have been argued to disprove free will were seen as reducing, but usually not eliminating free will, and the reductions were because of constrained conscious choice. We replicated findings that a minority of people think lacking a soul reduces free will. These reductions in perceived free will were fully explained by reductions in people's perceived abilities to make conscious decisions. Thus, some people do think you need a soul to have free will-but it is because they think you need a soul to make conscious decisions.
四项实验支持了这一假设,即普通人将自由意志理解为不受约束的选择,而非拥有灵魂。除非受到内部约束(即损害人们做出选择的心理能力的因素)或外部约束(即阻碍人们按自己意愿选择和行动的情况)的影响,人们始终会将自由意志评定为较高水平。那些被认为能反驳自由意志的科学范式被视为会降低自由意志,但通常不会将其消除,而这种降低是由于有意识选择受到了约束。我们重复了这样的研究结果,即少数人认为缺乏灵魂会降低自由意志。人们感知到的自由意志的这些降低完全可以通过人们感知到的做出有意识决定的能力的降低来解释。因此,有些人确实认为需要有灵魂才能拥有自由意志——但这是因为他们认为需要有灵魂才能做出有意识的决定。