Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, 02139, USA.
Nat Commun. 2018 Mar 28;9(1):1259. doi: 10.1038/s41467-018-03680-4.
Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner's obligation. Here we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.
核裁军条约本身并不能消除核武器带来的生存威胁。为了在将拆除的核弹头计入条约伙伴的义务之前，验证其真实性，需要相关技术。在这里，我们提出了一种利用同位素特异性核共振现象的概念，通过将核弹头的可裂变部件与先前经过验证的模板进行比较，从而对其进行认证。所有信息都以物理零知识证明系统的方式在物理域中加密。通过蒙特卡罗模拟，该系统被证明不会泄露武器的任何同位素或几何信息，同时能够轻松检测到伪造企图。这种核技术可以极大地提高未来核裁军条约的可信度和影响力。
