Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg.
Hum Factors. 2018 Aug;60(5):699-718. doi: 10.1177/0018720818769250. Epub 2018 Apr 17.
The aim of this study was to apply work domain analysis for cybersecurity assessment and design of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
Adoption of information and communication technology in cyberphysical systems (CPSs) for critical infrastructures enables automated and distributed control but introduces cybersecurity risk. Many CPSs employ SCADA industrial control systems that have become the target of cyberattacks, which inflict physical damage without use of force. Given that absolute security is not feasible for complex systems, cyberintrusions that introduce unanticipated events will occur; a proper response will in turn require human adaptive ability. Therefore, analysis techniques that can support security assessment and human factors engineering are invaluable for defending CPSs.
We conducted work domain analysis using the abstraction hierarchy (AH) to model a generic SCADA implementation to identify the functional structures and means-ends relations. We then adopted a case study approach examining the Stuxnet cyberattack by developing and integrating AHs for the uranium enrichment process, SCADA implementation, and malware to investigate the interactions between the three aspects of cybersecurity in CPSs.
The AHs for modeling a generic SCADA implementation and studying the Stuxnet cyberattack are useful for mapping attack vectors, identifying deficiencies in security processes and features, and evaluating proposed security solutions with respect to system objectives.
Work domain analysis is an effective analytical method for studying cybersecurity of CPSs for critical infrastructures in a psychologically relevant manner.
Work domain analysis should be applied to assess cybersecurity risk and inform engineering and user interface design.
本研究旨在将工作域分析应用于网络安全评估和监控与数据采集（SCADA）系统的设计。
在关键基础设施的网络物理系统（CPS）中采用信息和通信技术可实现自动化和分布式控制，但也引入了网络安全风险。许多 CPS 采用 SCADA 工业控制系统，这些系统已成为网络攻击的目标，这些攻击无需使用武力即可造成物理损坏。鉴于复杂系统不可能实现绝对安全，引入意外事件的网络入侵将会发生；适当的响应反过来又需要人类的适应能力。因此，能够支持安全评估和人为因素工程的分析技术对于防御 CPS 是非常宝贵的。
我们使用抽象层次（AH）进行工作域分析，对通用 SCADA 实现进行建模，以识别功能结构和手段-目的关系。然后，我们通过开发和集成铀浓缩过程、SCADA 实现和恶意软件的 AH，对 Stuxnet 网络攻击进行案例研究，研究 CPS 中网络安全的三个方面之间的相互作用。
用于对通用 SCADA 实现进行建模和研究 Stuxnet 网络攻击的 AH 可用于映射攻击向量、识别安全过程和功能的缺陷，并评估针对系统目标的拟议安全解决方案。
工作域分析是一种有效的分析方法，可用于以心理相关的方式研究关键基础设施的 CPS 的网络安全。
应将工作域分析应用于网络安全风险评估，并为工程和用户界面设计提供信息。
