Gordon John-Stewart
Bioethics. 2018 May;32(4):223-232. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12434.
This article examines the nature of human dignity against the background of old age and introduces the novel idea of treating human dignity as a formal principle related to the more foundational notion of indignity. The discussion starts with the objection that the notion of human dignity can be used to justify contrary positions and is therefore inconclusive. This pitfall can be averted by appealing to the notion of indignity rather than dignity in one's moral reasoning and decision-making. Cases of indignity are more primary and indicate the violation of the very core of a human being. The verifiable property of vulnerability is central to this identification of indignity, as is illustrated by reference to the experiences of elderly people. The article argues for applying the concept of human dignity to reverse the conditions that existed before a particular indignity emerged, rather than trying to define positively the notion of human dignity in the first place.
本文在老年背景下审视人类尊严的本质，并引入了将人类尊严视为与更基本的不尊严概念相关的形式原则这一新颖观点。讨论始于这样一种反对意见，即人类尊严的概念可被用于为相反立场辩护，因此是不确定的。在道德推理和决策中诉诸不尊严而非尊严的概念，可以避免这一陷阱。不尊严的案例更为首要，并表明对人的核心的侵犯。易受伤害这一可证实的属性对于这种不尊严的认定至关重要，以老年人的经历为例可说明这一点。本文主张应用人类尊严的概念来扭转特定不尊严出现之前存在的状况，而不是首先试图正面界定人类尊严的概念。
