Long T A
University of Cincinnati, Ohio.
J Med Ethics. 1988 Jun;14(2):79-81. doi: 10.1136/jme.14.2.79.
Since 1973 the practice of infanticide for some severely handicapped newborns has been receiving more open discussion and defence in the literature on medical ethics. A recent and important argument for the permissibility of infanticide relies crucially on a particular concept of personhood that excludes the theological. This paper attempts to show that the dispute between the proponents of infanticide and their religious opponents cannot be resolved because one side's perspective on the infant is shaped by a metaphysics that is emphatically rejected by the other. In such a situation philosophical argument is powerless to bring about a resolution because there can be no refutation of one side by the other.
自1973年以来，对于一些严重残疾新生儿实施杀婴行为在医学伦理文献中得到了越来越公开的讨论和辩护。最近一个支持杀婴行为可允许性的重要论点关键依赖于一种排除神学因素的特定人格概念。本文试图表明，杀婴行为的支持者与其宗教反对者之间的争议无法得到解决，因为一方对婴儿的看法是由另一方坚决拒绝的形而上学塑造的。在这种情况下，哲学论证无力促成解决方案，因为一方无法反驳另一方。
