Kuhse H, Singer P
Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia.
J Med Ethics. 1991 Dec;17(4):205-6. doi: 10.1136/jme.17.4.205.
In earlier publications, we had argued that Paul Ramsey is inconsistent because he simultaneously asserts that (i) 'all our days and years are of equal worth' and (ii) 'that it is permissible to refrain from prolonging the lives of some dying patients'. Thomas Long has suggested that we have not shown that Paul Ramsey is inconsistent. Ramsey and we, he holds, start from incommensurable metaphysical views: for Ramsey, the dying process has religious significance--God is calling his servant home. While it is normally a good thing to keep a patient alive, it would, for Ramsey, show deafness to God's call to keep a dying patient alive. It is true we do not share Paul Ramsey's religious views. It is, however, not necessary to rely on any particular metaphysical views to refute Ramsey's position. For Ramsey's view to be internally consistent, Ramsey would have to be able to distinguish between dying and non-dying patients. We examine some of Ramsey's examples and show that his practical judgements do not allow us to draw this distinction. This means that, contra Long, we hold fast to our charge that Ramsey's view is inconsistent.
在早期的出版物中，我们曾认为保罗·拉姆齐的观点存在矛盾之处，因为他同时断言：（i）“我们所有的日子和年岁都具有同等价值”，以及（ii）“可以不为某些濒死患者延长生命”。托马斯·朗认为我们并未证明保罗·拉姆齐的观点存在矛盾。他认为，拉姆齐和我们基于不可通约的形而上学观点出发：对拉姆齐而言，死亡过程具有宗教意义——上帝在召唤他的仆人回家。虽然通常让患者活着是件好事，但对拉姆齐来说，让濒死患者活着就是对上帝召唤充耳不闻。的确，我们并不认同保罗·拉姆齐的宗教观点。然而，反驳拉姆齐的立场并不需要依赖任何特定的形而上学观点。要使拉姆齐的观点在内部保持一致，他必须能够区分濒死患者和非濒死患者。我们研究了拉姆齐的一些例子，并表明他的实际判断无法让我们做出这种区分。这意味着，与朗的观点相反，我们坚持认为拉姆齐的观点存在矛盾这一指控。
