Rasmussen Lisa M
Department of Philosophy, UNC Charlotte, 9201 University City Blvd., Charlotte, NC, 28223, USA.
HEC Forum. 2018 Jun;30(2):171-185. doi: 10.1007/s10730-018-9353-8.
Abram Brummett and Christopher Ostertag offer critiques of my argument that clinical ethics consultants have expertise but are not "ethics experts" (Brummett and Ostertag 2018). My argument begins within our less-than-ideal world and asks what a justification of a clinical ethics consultation recommendation might look like under those conditions. It is a challenge to what could be called an "inflationary" position on ethics expertise that requires agreement on or rational proof of metaethical facts about the values at stake in clinical ethics consultation. Brummett and Ostertag critique three distinct steps in the argument. Two of those I have a brief answer for, and an assessment of the third demonstrates that Brummett and Ostertag do not consider the premise upon which I based my account. Instead, they assert a counter-premise without argument, which at best results in a stalemate between our two accounts. However, the reasons supporting my premise still seem to me to be stronger, so I am in the end unconvinced by their critiques.
艾布拉姆·布鲁梅特和克里斯托弗·奥斯特塔格对我的观点提出了批评，我的观点是临床伦理顾问有专业知识，但并非“伦理专家”（布鲁梅特和奥斯特塔格，2018年）。我的论证始于我们这个不太理想的世界，并探讨在这些条件下临床伦理咨询建议的正当理由可能是什么样的。这是对所谓伦理专业知识“膨胀论”立场的一种挑战，这种立场要求就临床伦理咨询中所涉及价值的元伦理事实达成一致意见或进行合理证明。布鲁梅特和奥斯特塔格批评了该论证中的三个不同步骤。其中两个步骤我有简短回应，而对第三个步骤的评估表明，布鲁梅特和奥斯特塔格没有考虑我论证所基于的前提。相反，他们未经论证就断言了一个相反的前提，这充其量只会导致我们两种观点陷入僵局。然而，在我看来，支持我前提的理由似乎仍然更充分，所以最终我并不信服他们的批评。
