Brummett Abram, Ostertag Christopher J
Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, St. Louis University, St. Louis, MO, USA.
HEC Forum. 2018 Jun;30(2):157-169. doi: 10.1007/s10730-017-9321-8.
In a recent issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, several scholars wrote on the topic of ethics expertise in clinical ethics consultation. The articles in this issue exemplified what we consider to be two troubling trends in the quest to articulate a unique expertise for clinical ethicists. The first trend, exemplified in the work of Lisa Rasmussen, is an attempt to define a role for clinical ethicists that denies they have ethics expertise. Rasmussen cites the dependence of ethical expertise on irresolvable meta-ethical debates as the reason for this move. We argue against this deflationary strategy because it ends up smuggling in meta-ethical assumptions it claims to avoid. Specifically, we critique Rasmussen's distinction between the ethical and normative features of clinical ethics cases. The second trend, exemplified in the work of Dien Ho, also attempts to avoid meta-ethics. However, unlike Rasmussen, Ho tries to articulate a notion of ethics expertise that does not rely upon meta-ethics. Specifically, we critique Ho's attempts to explain how clinical ethicists can resolve moral disputes using what he calls the "Default Principle" and "arguments by parity." We show that these strategies do not work unless those with the moral disagreement already share certain meta-ethical assumptions. Ultimately, we argue that the two trends of (1) attempting to avoid meta-ethics by denying that clinical ethicists have ethics expertise, and (2) attempting to articulate how ethics expertise can be used to resolve disputes without meta-ethics both fail because they do not, in fact, avoid doing meta-ethics. We conclude that these trends detract from what clinical ethics consultation was founded to do and ought to still be doing-provide moral guidance, which requires ethics expertise, and engagement with meta-ethics. To speak of ethicists without ethics expertise leaves their role in the clinic dangerously unclear and unjustified.
在最近一期的《医学与哲学杂志》上,几位学者撰写了关于临床伦理咨询中的伦理专业知识这一主题的文章。本期的这些文章体现了我们认为在试图阐明临床伦理学家独特专业知识的过程中存在的两个令人不安的趋势。第一个趋势以丽莎·拉斯穆森的作品为例,即试图为临床伦理学家定义一个角色,却否认他们拥有伦理专业知识。拉斯穆森将伦理专业知识对无法解决的元伦理辩论的依赖作为此举的理由。我们反对这种贬低性策略,因为它最终偷偷引入了它声称要避免的元伦理假设。具体而言,我们批评拉斯穆森对临床伦理案例的伦理特征和规范特征的区分。第二个趋势以迪恩·何的作品为例,同样试图回避元伦理学。然而,与拉斯穆森不同的是,何试图阐明一种不依赖元伦理学的伦理专业知识概念。具体而言,我们批评何试图解释临床伦理学家如何使用他所谓的“默认原则”和“同等情况论证”来解决道德争议。我们表明,除非存在道德分歧的各方已经共享某些元伦理假设,否则这些策略是行不通的。最终,我们认为这两个趋势——(1)通过否认临床伦理学家拥有伦理专业知识来试图回避元伦理学,以及(2)试图阐明如何在不涉及元伦理学的情况下利用伦理专业知识来解决争议——都失败了,因为它们实际上并没有避免进行元伦理学。我们得出结论,这些趋势背离了临床伦理咨询创立之初以及现在仍应做的事情——提供道德指导,而这需要伦理专业知识,并涉及元伦理学。谈论没有伦理专业知识的伦理学家会使他们在临床中的角色处于危险的不明确和不合理状态。